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First Amendment Limits on Library Collection Management*
Anne Klinefelter**
First Amendment freedoms impose some limits on publicly funded libraries’ discre-
tion to manage their collections, but identifying those limits is difficult. The First 
Amendment law of libraries is murky territory, defined by three Supreme Court 
decisions that failed to produce majority opinions and lower court opinions that have 
employed a variety of doctrinal approaches. Libraries nonetheless must make sense 
of these cases to create and implement collection development and Internet access 
policies and procedures. This article surveys and analyzes the First Amendment law 
of library collections and finds that libraries’ discretion is broad, but certain limita-
tions apply. These can serve as a reminder to librarians of their ethical commitment 
to challenge censorship and provide access to all points of view. 
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Introduction
¶1	May	a	state	law	library	adopt	a	policy	to	collect	books	written	by	Democrats	
but	 not	 Republicans?	May	 a	 county	 law	 library	 decline	 to	 add	 to	 its	 collection	
























tion	 or	 removal	 of	materials	 from	 library	 collections.1	And	 all	 law	 libraries	 are	
	 1.	 The	 organization	 called	 Students	 for	 Academic	 Freedom	 has	 promoted	 a	 greater	 repre-
sentation	 of	 conservative	 viewpoints	 in	 higher	 education	 and	might	 target	 campus	 libraries.	 See	










they	 probably	 prevent	 all	 publicly	 funded	 libraries	 from	 removing	 and	 perhaps	
excluding	materials	as	an	attempt	solely	to	suppress	access	to	the	view	expressed.	
And	these	First	Amendment	restrictions	suggest	that	publicly	funded	law	libraries	








veying	Supreme	Court	and	relevant	 lower	court	opinions	 to	 identify	 the	existing	
boundaries	of	libraries’	discretion	under	the	First	Amendment.	This	examination	
of	 library	First	Amendment	cases	has	 four	goals:	 (1)	 to	explain	why	 library	First	
Amendment	 law	 is	 complex	 and	 confusing;	 (2)	 to	 provide	 a	 current	 survey	 of	
Supreme	Court	and	lower	court	cases;	(3)	to	show	that	the	First	Amendment	limits	














university	 and	academic	 law	 libraries.	Robert	V.	Labaree,	The Regulation of Hate Speech on College 
Campuses and the Library Bill of Rights,	19	J. AcAd. LibrAriAnship 372	(1994).
	 2.	 See infra	¶¶	20–22.
	 3.	 Barbara	 Bintliff	 &	 Richard	 A.	 Danner,	 Academic Freedom Issues for Academic Librarians,	
LegAL reference services Q.,	2006,	No.	4,	at	13,	20.	For	more	on	the	academic	freedom	aspect	of	the	
First	Amendment	question,	see	infra ¶	22.	
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right	of	the	people	peaceably	to	assemble,	and	to	petition	the	government	for	a	
redress	of	grievances.4	
features of first Amendment Law Relating to Libraries
¶7	Library	First	Amendment	law	is	a	function	both	of	constitutional	doctrine	
and	of	the	practice	of	library	management.	The	following	summaries	of	the	special	
characteristics	 of	 the	 law	 and	 of	 library	 collection	 management	 show	 how	 the	
intersection	between	the	two	has	aspects	of	a	collision	of	interests	rather	than	an	
artful	 intertwining	 of	 similar	 missions.	 These	 sections	 explain	 why	 the	 First	
Amendment	law	of	libraries	is	so	messy	and	provide	context	for	the	case	analysis	
that	follows.	
Conflict Between Collection Selectivity and Neutral Treatment of Speech 
¶8	 Law	 librarians	 in	 publicly	 funded	 libraries	 may	 think	 of	 their	 collection	
management	 and	 other	 services	 as	 supporting	 First	 Amendment	 freedoms	 of	
speech	and	the	press	because	these	libraries	increase	access	to	information,	largely	
without	direct	cost	to	the	library	user.	Indeed,	library	associations	promote	ethical	
principles	 that	 encourage	 broad	 access	 to	 a	 diversity	 of	 ideas.	 The	 American	
Association	 of	 Law	 Libraries	 (AALL)	 endorses	 the	 Library	 Bill	 of	 Rights	 of	 the	
American	Library	Association,	which	asserts	that	libraries	should	“challenge	cen-
sorship”	and	present	“all	points	of	view”	in	library	collections.5	This	policy	states	
that	 “library	 resources	 should	 be	 provided	 for	 the	 interest,	 information,	 and	
enlightenment	of	all	people	of	the	community	.	.	.	.”6	The	AALL	Ethical	Principles	
lead	with	the	declaration	that	law	libraries	make	it	possible	for	individuals	to	par-
ticipate	 fully	 in	 the	 democratic	 process.7	 These	 statements	 show	 that	 librarians,	







	 4.	 U.s. const.	amend.	I.
	 5.	 Am. LibrAry Ass’n coUnciL, LibrAry biLL of rights (1996),	 available at	 http://www.ala
.org/ala/aboutala/offices/oif/statementspols/statementsif/librarybillofrights.pdf;	 Am.	 Ass’n	 of	 Law	
Libraries,	Government	Relations	Policy	§	V	(Apr.	2008), available at	http://www.aallnet.org/about/
policy_government.asp.
	 6.	 Am. LibrAry Ass’n coUnciL, supra note	5.
	 7.	 See Am.	Ass’n	 of	 Law	Libraries,	 Ethical	 Principles	 (Apr.	 5,	 1999),	available at	 http://www
.aallnet.org/about/policy_ethics.asp.	
	 8.	 William	P.	Marshall,	In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment Justification,	30	
gA. L. rev.	1,	1	(1995).	See also Citizens	United	v.	FCC,	130	S.	Ct.	876,	884	(2010);	John stUArt miLL, 
on Liberty	15–52	(Elizabeth	Rapaport	ed.,	Hackett	Pub.	Co.	1978)	(1859).
	 9.	 See, e.g.,	Rosenberger	v.	Rector	&	Visitors	of	Univ.	of	Va.,	515	U.S.	819,	835	(1995);	C.	Edwin	
Baker,	 Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech,	 25	UcLA L. rev.	 964	 (1978);	Martin	H.	
Redish,	The Value of Free Speech,	130	U. pA. L. rev.	591	(1982).
	 10.	 See, e.g.,	Citizens United,	130	S.	Ct.	at	898;	Alexander	Meiklejohn,	The	First Amendment Is an 
Absolute,	1961	sUp. ct. rev.	245,	263.












mission	 to	manage	 limited	 resources	 through	access	 to	 current	primary	 law	and	
practice	guides.	




goal	 of	 individual	 expression	 and	 development.	 Further,	 if	 libraries’	 selection	
choices	are	seen	as	representing	the	government’s	view	of	what	is	the	best	informa-
tion,	 libraries	 compromise	 two	 other	 goals	 commonly	 attributed	 to	 the	 First	
Amendment—citizen	 oversight	 of	 government13	 and	 the	 prevention	 of	 govern-
ment’s	ability	to	make	speech	distinctions.14	One	might	well	argue	that	selectivity	
in	 law	 library	collections,	particularly	 if	 it	applied	to	providing	access	 to	 the	 law,	
would	frustrate	the	First	Amendment	goal	of	democracy.	
¶12	Selectivity	in	library	collections,	though,	is	unavoidable	given	the	scarcity	of	




librarians,	 however,	 promote	 a	 shift	 from	 the	 public	 community	 library’s	 tradi-
tional	 purpose	 as	 moral	 and	 intellectual	 arbiter	 to	 a	 more	 neutral	 information	
manager.15	These	advocates	sometimes	seek	court	support	for	their	efforts	to	pro-
vide	access	to	controversial	materials	through	enforcement	of	the	First	Amendment.16	
	 11.	 See, e.g.,	Police	Dep’t	of	Chicago	v.	Mosley,	408	U.S.	92	 (1972)	 (applying	 strict	 scrutiny	 to	
content-based	regulations).
	 12.	 See, e.g.,	Cornelius	v.	NAACP	Legal	Def.	&	Educ.	Fund,	Inc.,	473	U.S.	788,	806,	812–13	(1985)	
(remanding	for	determination	of	whether	suppression	of	viewpoint	was	motivation	for	regulations).	
	 13.	 See, e.g.,	Rosenberger,	515	U.S.	at	835;	Vincent	Blasi,	The Checking Value in First Amendment 
Theory,	1977	A.b.A. foUnd. res. J.	521.	
	 14.	 See Ruth	Walden,	A Government Action Approach to First Amendment Analysis,	69	JoUrnALism 
Q.	65	(1992).
	 15.	 See, e.g.,	JAmes LArUe, the new inQUisition: UnderstAnding And mAnAging inteLLectUAL 
freedom chALLenges	 (2007);	 office for inteLLectUAL freedom of the Am. LibrAry Ass’n, 
inteLLectUAL freedom mAnUAL	 (7th	 ed.	 2006);	LoUise s. robbins, censorship And the AmericAn 
LibrAry: the AmericAn LibrAry AssociAtion’s response to threAts to inteLLectUAL freedom, 
1939–1969	(1996).
	 16.	 See United	States	v.	Am.	Library	Ass’n (ALA II),	539	U.S.	194	(2003)	(plurality	opinion);	John	







of	 applying	 standard	First	Amendment	analysis	 in	 library	cases	 for	 fear	 that	 the	
entire	library	system	could	be	found	in	violation	of	the	First	Amendment.18	











the	 library	 user’s	 right	 to	 receive	 information	 through	 the	 rights	 of	 freedom	of	
speech	and	of	the	press.25	As	libraries	increase	Internet	services,	patrons	may	chal-
lenge	any	policies	or	software	filters	that	restrict	library	Internet	use	as	interference	




the	role	of	libraries	in	society,	see	Raizel	Liebler,	Institutions of Learning or Havens for Illegal Activities: 








Nos.	 80-2163,	 82-2264,	 1987	WL	 4804	 (D.D.C.	 Jan.	 16,	 1987)	 (considering	 association	 rights	 of	
employees	under	policy	of	access	to	meeting	rooms	for	employee	organizations),	aff ’d,	865	F.2d	1329	
(Table)	(D.C.	Cir.	Jan.	25,	1989).	
	 20.	 Bd.	of	Educ.	v.	Pico	(Pico III),	457	U.S.	853	(1982)	(plurality	opinion).
	 21.	 Sund	v.	City	of	Wichita	Falls,	121	F.	Supp.	2d	530	(N.D.	Tex.	2000).
	 22.	 ALA II,	539	U.S.	194;	Miller	v.	Nw.	Region	Library	Bd.,	348	F.	Supp.	2d	563	(M.D.N.C.	2004);	
Mainstream	Loudoun	v.	Bd.	of	Trs.	(Loudoun I),	2	F.	Supp.	2d	783	(E.D.	Va.	1998);	Crosby	v.	S.	Orange	
County	Cmty.	Coll.	Dist.,	172	Cal.	App.	4th	433	(Cal.	Ct.	App.	2009).




	 25.	 Am.	Library	Ass’n	v.	United	States	(ALA I),	201	F.	Supp.	2d	401,	450–51	(E.D.	Pa.	2002),	rev’d,	
539	U.S.	194	(2003).
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with	a	right	to	quiet	expression	on	blogs	and	wikis	or	a	right	to	petition	the	govern-
ment	through	e-mail	to	officials.26	














forums	 to	 determine	 their	 level	 of	 obligation	 under	 the	 First	 Amendment.	
Government	actors	are	categorized	as	traditional	public	forums,	designated	or	lim-
ited	public	forums,	and	nonpublic	forums.	Traditional	public	forums,	idealized	as	
a	public	park,	 are	 those	where	First	Amendment	 freedoms	are	most	protected.30	
Designated	 or	 limited	 public	 forums	 must	 protect	 First	 Amendment	 freedoms	



























350 LAW LIBRARY JOURNAL Vol. 102:3  [2010-21]
according	to	their	commitments	to	do	so,31	and	nonpublic	forums	must	meet	rela-
tively	minimal	 requirements	under	 the	First	Amendment.32	Library	 cases	 are	 all	
over	 the	map	 in	 terms	 of	 forum	 analysis.	 Some	 library	 cases	 predate	 or	 ignore	
modern	forum	analysis;	some	have	found	public	libraries	to	be	designated	public	
forums	 for	 the	 limited	 purpose	 of	 the	 right	 to	 receive	 information;	 and	 others,	





tion,	 law	 librarians	must	 turn	 to	 cases	 about	other	publicly	 funded	 libraries	 for	








patron	groups’	 legal	 research	needs,	 and	 even	 less	neutrality	 from	public	 school	
libraries	whose	mission	is	even	narrower	because	of	its	link	to	the	inculcative	and	
curricular	roles	of	schools.34	




information	 through	 the	 library.35	Courts	 are	 reluctant	 to	 characterize	 the	 First	
Amendment	as	a	positive	 right	 that	 requires	 the	government	 to	affirmatively	do	
something,	such	as	purchase	a	particular	book	or	even	keep	it	on	the	shelves.	The	







	 32.	 Generally,	 courts	have	 found	 that	 government	properties	 or	programs	 that	 are	not	 tradi-
tional	 or	 designated	 public	 forums	 are	 by	 default	 nonpublic	 forums,	 but	 a	 relatively	 new	 fourth	
category	of	“not	[a]	for[um]	at	all”	may	also	exist.	Ark.	Educ.	Television	Comm’n	v.	Forbes,	523	U.S.	
666,	677	(1998).




	 35.	 See Susan	Nevelow	Mart,	The Right to Receive Information,	95	LAw Libr. J.	175,	2003	LAw Libr. 
J.	11.




In	contrast,	a	 law	 that	prohibited	 the	community	 from	reading	 that	book	would	













meet	 First	 Amendment	 doctrinal	 tests	 because	 that	 removal	 could	 constitute	




nificant	 judicial	 discomfort	 with	 the	 positive	 right	 implications	 of	 a	 First	
Amendment	right	to	receive	information.41
Evidence and Judicial Workload Concerns Limit  




librarian	 in	 acquiring,	 rejecting,	 or	 removing	 a	 book.	However,	 traditional	 book	
selection	presents	evidentiary	and	workload	challenges	courts	do	not	welcome.43	
	 36.	 On	 the	 topic	 of	 government	 subsidies	 and	 free	 expression,	 see	 generally	 Seth	 F.	 Kreimer,	
Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State,	 132	U. pA. L. rev.	 1293	
(1984);	Martin	H.	Redish	&	Daryl	I.	Kessler,	Government Subsidies and Free Expression,	80	minn. L. 
rev.	543	(1996).
	 37.	 See Pico III,	457	U.S.	853	(plurality	opinion).	
	 38.	 Kreimer	v.	Bureau	of	Police,	958	F.2d	1242	(3d	Cir.	1992).	
	 39.	 See Pico III,	457	U.S.	853	(plurality	opinion);	ACLU	v.	Miami-Dade	County	Sch.	Bd.,	557	F.3d	
1177	(11th	Cir.), cert. denied,	130	S.	Ct.	659	(2009).	
	 40.	 Kreimer,	958	F.2d	1242;	Neinast	v.	Bd.	of	Trs.,	346	F.3d	585	(6th	Cir.	2003).	
	 41.	 See Pico III,	457	U.S.	at	889	(Burger,	C.J.,	dissenting)	(arguing	that	recognition	of	a	right	to	
receive	information	was	an	improper	creation	of	an	affirmative	right	and	would	make	a	public	library	
a	“slavish	courier	of	the	material	of	third	parties”).
	 42.	 Id. (plurality	opinion);	ACLU v.	Miami-Dade,	557	F.3d	1177.	
	 43.	 The	 same	 approach	 could	 apply	 to	 review	 of	 decisions	 about	 other	 tangible	 materials	
in	 a	 library’s	 collection,	 although	 the	 decision	 to	 add	 or	 remove	 a	 subscription	 to	 a	 journal	 or	 a	







in	number	and	more	often	produce	a	 trail	of	 evidence	 that	 can	be	 reviewed	 for	
discriminatory	intent.	Courts	have	noted	that	the	lowered	evidentiary	and	work-
load	 barriers	 make	 removal	 and	 relocation	 cases	 more	 appropriate	 for	 First	
Amendment	judicial	review.45
Proposals for Constitutional Protection of Libraries’ Discretion
¶20	Several	 scholarly	proposals	would	give	 libraries	 constitutional	protection	
based	on	the	libraries’	right	to	free	speech,	not	just	First	Amendment	accommoda-








tutes	protected	 speech	under	 the	First	Amendment.	The	American Library Ass’n 
Court	acknowledged	that	this	argument	would	not	be	consistent	with	precedent,	




	 44.	 See United	States	v.	Am.	Library	Ass’n (ALA II),	539	U.S.	194,	241–42	(2003)	(Souter,	J.,	dis-
senting,	joined	by	Ginsburg,	J.);	Pico	v.	Bd.	of	Educ.	(Pico II), 638	F.2d	404,	413–14	(2d	Cir.	1980),	
aff ’d,	457	U.S.	853	(1982).	
	 45.	 ALA II,	539	U.S.	at	242	(Souter,	J.,	dissenting,	joined	by	Ginsburg,	J.)	(citing	the	plurality’s	
conclusion	in	Pico III). 
	 46.	 David	Fagundes,	State Actors as First Amendment Speakers,	100	nw. U.L. rev.	1637	(2006)	
(proposing	recognition	as	protected	government	speech	based	on	relevance	to	the	institutional	mis-
sion	and	on	positive	impact	on	public	discourse);	Felix	Wu,	United	States	v.	American	Library	Ass’n: 
The Children’s Internet Protection Act, Library Filtering, and Institutional Roles,	 19	berkeLey tech. 
L.J.	 555	 (2004)	 (arguing	 that	 libraries’	discretion	 to	 filter	 the	 Internet	 is	 a	 form	of	 speech	activity	
deserving	of	First	Amendment	protection). But see Erwin	Chemerinsky,	Moving to the Right, Perhaps 
Sharply to the Right,	 12	green bAg	 2d	 413	 (2009)	 (arguing	 that	 the	 government	 speech	 doctrine	
threatens	protection	of	individuals’	First	Amendment	rights);	Andy	G.	Olree,	Identifying Government 
Speech,	42	conn. L. rev.	365	(2009)	(stating	that	the	ALA II and	Pico III decisions	show	the	Court	is	
not	willing	to	recognize	library	collections	as	government	speech).
	 47.	 ALA II,	539	U.S.	at	210–11.









other	 government	 bodies	 that	 would	 regulate	 the	 library.	 As	 a	 result,	 conflicts	
among	 patrons,	 libraries,	 and	 library	 regulators	 could	 frame	 all	 of	 the	 parties’	
claims	as	First	Amendment	claims.	
¶22	Other	proposals	would	give	 libraries	or	 librarians	constitutional	 status	as	
trustworthy	experts	in	balancing	both	First	Amendment	and	library	management	
concerns.50	 Under	 this	 theory,	 libraries	 or	 librarians	 would	 have	 some	 First	
Amendment	immunity	from	the	challenges	of	 library	patrons	and	the	regulatory	
authority	of	other	government	bodies.	While	courts	have	allowed	libraries	special	





not	 accepted	 any	 proposal	 that	 would	 give	 libraries	 absolute	 discretion	 in	 book	
selection	and	Internet-access	management.	The	boundaries	of	courts’	willingness	
to	defer	to	libraries	are	fuzzy,	but	even	the	deferential	standard	of	the	plurality	in	
American Library Ass’n	 suggests	 limits,	 and	 lower	 courts	have	 continued	 to	 treat	
libraries’	discretion	as	limited.	




	 50.	 Proposals	for	 institutional	deference	or	even	autonomy	generally	advocate	this	recognition	
for	public	 libraries	or	offer	 guidelines	 that	would	encompass	public	 libraries.	See	Lee	C.	Bollinger,	
Public Institutions of Culture and the First Amendment: The New Frontier,	 63	U. cin. L. rev.	 1103	
(1995);	Bruce	C.	Hafen,	Hazelwood	School	District and the Role of First Amendment Institutions,	1988	
dUke L.J.	685; Paul	Horwitz,	Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers and Hard 
Questions,	54	UcLA L. rev.	1497	(2007);	Frederick	C.	Schauer,	Principles, Institutions, and the First 
Amendment,	112	hArv. L. rev.	84,	115	(1998).	Some	proposals	would	extend	protection	to	the	deci-
sions	of	librarians	but	not	library	boards.	See Jim	Chen,	Mastering Eliot’s Paradox: Fostering Cultural 
Memory in an Age of Illusion and Allusion,	 89	minn. L. rev. 1361,	1379	 (2005);	Robert	M.	O’Neil,	
Libraries, Librarians and First Amendment Freedoms,	4	hUm. rts.	295,	309	(1975);	Rodney	A.	Smolla,	
Freedom of Speech for Libraries and Librarians,	85	LAw Libr. J.	71,	73	(1993);	Mark	G.	Yudof,	Library 
Book Selection and the Public Schools: The Quest for the Archimedean Point,	59	ind. L.J.	527,	553–55	
(1984).	
	 51.	 See Bintliff	 &	 Danner,	 supra	 note	 3;	 see also Gemma	Devinney,	Academic Librarians and 
Academic Freedom in the United States: A History and Analysis,	37	Libri 24 (1986). Academic	freedom	
has	not	been	afforded	a	clear	status	under	the	First	Amendment.	See	J.	Peter	Byrne,	Neo-orthodoxy in 
Academic Freedom,	88	tex. L. rev. 143	(2009)	(reviewing	mAtthew w. finkin & robert c. post, for 
the common good: principLes of AmericAn AcAdemic freedom (2009) and	stAnLey fish, sAve the 
worLd on yoUr own time (2008)). 
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the U.S. Supreme court Has given Increasing Latitude to Libraries
Three Cases Demonstrate Variation in Facts and Analysis 
¶24	The	Supreme	Court	has	ruled	on	three	cases	considering	the	application	of	
the	First	Amendment	to	libraries.	Public	community	libraries	were	the	subject	of	
two	cases,	 and	a	public	 school	 library	was	 the	context	 for	 the	 third.	These	cases	
provide	thin	guidance	on	how	a	library	should	manage	its	collection	because	none	
produced	majority	opinions	with	clear	 rules	of	First	Amendment	application	 to	










Brown v. Louisiana 
¶25	The	first	time	the	Supreme	Court	considered	the	applicability	of	the	First	




the	 holding	 and	 discussion	 has	 influenced	 the	 First	 Amendment	 law	 of	 public	
library	collection	management.	
¶26	Brown v. Louisiana was	decided	in	1966,	more	than	a	decade	after	the	more	






policy	 through	a	planned	visit	 that	 included	a	 request	 for	 a	book	 followed	by	 a	
quiet	sit-in.58	Mr.	Brown	requested	a	book,	and	the	library	staff	member	identified	
	 52.	 See Brown	v.	Louisiana,	383	U.S.	131	(1966)	(plurality	opinion).
	 53.	 See Bd.	of	Educ.	v.	Pico	(Pico III),	457	U.S.	853	(1982)	(plurality	opinion).
	 54.	 See United	States	v.	Am.	Library	Ass’n (ALA II),	539	U.S.	194	(2003)	(plurality	opinion).
	 55.	 Brown v. Louisiana,	383	U.S.	131.




hoLLAwAy,	A Negro Library, in bookmArks: reAding in bLAck And white: A memoir	28	(2006).
	 57.	 Brown	v.	Bd.	of	Educ.,	347	U.S.	483	(1954).
	 58.	 Actually,	only	one	of	 the	men,	Quincy	Brown,	was	able	 to	sit,	because	only	one	chair	was	
available	for	library	patrons	in	the	small	branch	library.	The	four	other	men	stood	beside	Mr.	Brown.	
Brown v. Louisiana,	383	U.S.	at	135–36.














ing	 library	 service.	 Justice	 Fortas	 authored	 the	 prevailing	 opinion	 and	 expressed	
regret	 that	 “a	 public	 library—a	 place	 dedicated	 to	 quiet,	 to	 knowledge,	 and	 to	
beauty”	 should	be	 the	 stage	 for	 confrontation,	 but	 concluded	 that	no	peace	was	
breached	by	the	five	men’s	behavior.60	The	opinion	went	further,	finding	that	con-




















	 60.	 Id. at	142.
	 61.	 Id.	at	141–42.	
	 62.	 Id. at	143.	




	 66.	 The	library	was	still	closed	at	the	time	of	the	Brown decision,	almost	two	years	after	the	sit-in.	
See id. at	151	(White,	J.,	concurring).
	 67.	 See infra	¶¶	33–44	for	a	discussion	of	ALA II	and	Pico III.






















cases	about	collection	management.	Brown v. Louisiana’s	 three-Justice	prevailing	
opinion	is	quoted	in	library	cases	for	the	characterization	of	a	library	as	“a	place	
dedicated	to	quiet,	to	knowledge,	and	to	beauty.”73	As	courts	have	developed	doc-
	 68.	 See also Ark.	 Educ.	 Television	Comm’n	 v.	 Forbes,	 523	U.S.	 666,	 681–82	 (1998)	 (avoiding	
application	of	standard	First	Amendment	requirements	because	public	broadcasters	might	choose—
and	 indeed	 the	 Nebraska	 Educational	 Television	 Network	 did	 so	 in	 the	 state’s	 1996	 U.S.	 Senate	
race—to	 cancel	 an	 election	 debate	 rather	 than	 provide	 time	 for	 all	 ballot-qualified	 candidates	 to	
participate).
	 69.	 The	American Library Ass’n	 plurality	opinion	 found	 that	public	 libraries	were	 selective	 in	
their	 collections	 as	 a	matter	of	design.	United	States	 v.	Am.	Library	Ass’n (ALA II),	 539	U.S.	 194,	
204–09	(2003).
	 70.	 One	 library	 journal	 report	questioned	 the	given	motivation,	 saying	 that	 the	 closing	 came	
just	a	few	weeks	after	the	incident	without	any	general	public	knowledge	that	plans	for	closing	had	
already	been	 in	progress.	“This	plan	 is	 supposed	 to	 save	 lots	of	money,	but	mostly	 (and	of	course	
they	don’t	admit	this)	it	keeps	Negroes	safely	out	of	any	buildings	.	.	.	.”	Lockouts and Arrests—Repeat 




	 71.	 Courts	have	accepted	 this	 trade-off	 in	 the	equal	protection	context.	Palmer	v.	Thompson,	
403	U.S.	 217	 (1971)	 (holding	 that	 the	 closing	 of	 public	 swimming	 pools	 rather	 than	 integrating	
them	was	facially	racially	neutral	and	therefore	not	in	violation	of	the	equal	protection	clause).	But 
see Deborah	L.	Brake,	When Equality Leaves Everyone Worse Off: The Problem of Leveling Down in 
Equality Law,	46	wm. & mAry L. rev.	513	(2004).
	 72.	 Mark	 Yudof	 suggested	 Brown	 may	 be	 “better	 understood	 as	 a	 race	 case	 than	 a	 First	
Amendment	 one.”	mArk g. yUdof,	when government speAks: poLitics, LAw, And government 
expression in AmericA	227	n.42	(1983).
	 73.	 Brown	v.	Louisiana,	383	U.S.	131,	142	(1966)	 (plurality	opinion).	The	Third	Circuit	cited	
Brown	as	authority	for	finding	a	public	library	to	be	a	limited	public	forum	for	the	right	to	receive	
information.	See Kreimer	v.	Bureau	of	Police,	958	F.2d	1242,	1261	(3d	Cir.	1992).




supporting	 access	 to	 speech	 but	 not	 in	 facilitating	 direct	 expression.74	 Some	 of	
these,	 in	 turn,	have	 formed	 the	basis	 for	 judicial	 review	of	 libraries’	decisions	 to	
restrict	access	to	particular	books	or	Internet	content.75	
¶32	Brown	 also	 serves	 as	 a	 reminder	 to	 libraries	 that	 when	 equal	 protection	
issues	are	intertwined	with	First	Amendment	issues,	courts	may	not	extend	as	much	




sion	 as	 a	 function	 of	 something	 other	 than	 an	 intention	 to	 suppress	 access	 to	
certain	ideas.
Board of Education v. Pico
¶33	The	second	Supreme	Court	opinion	that	addressed	a	public	library	and	the	
First	 Amendment	 was	 a	 challenge	 to	 school	 library	 book	 removal	 in Board of 









opinions	 involving	 both	 school77	 and	 public	 library	 collections,78	 and	 the	 local	
actors	treated	the	Court’s	remand	as	a	cue	to	restore	the	challenged	books	to	library	
shelves.	









	 75.	 See Sund	 v.	City	 of	Wichita	 Falls,	 121	F.	 Supp.	 2d	 530,	 547	 (N.D.	Tex.	 2000);	Mainstream	
Loudoun	v.	Bd.	of	Trs.	(Loudoun I),	2	F.	Supp.	2d	783,	792	(E.D.	Va.	1998).
	 76.	 Bd.	of	Educ.	v.	Pico	(Pico III),	457	U.S.	853	(1982)	(plurality	opinion).
	 77.	 See ACLU	v.	Miami-Dade	County	Sch.	Bd.,	557	F.3d	1177,	1199–1200	(11th	Cir.), cert. denied, 
130	S.	Ct.	659	(2009).	
	 78.	 See Kreimer,	958	F.2d	at	1253;	Sund,	121	F.	Supp.	2d	at	547;	Loudoun I,	2	F.	Supp.	2d	at	792.	
	 79.	 Pico III,	457	U.S.	at	857	(quoting	Pico	v.	Bd.	of	Educ. (Pico I),	474	F.	Supp.	387,	390	(E.D.N.Y.	
1979)).	 The	 books	 at	 issue	were	Kurt	Vonnegut,	 Jr.’s	Slaughter House Five,	Desmond	Morris’s	The 
Naked Ape,	Piri	Thomas’s	Down These Mean Streets,	 the	Langston	Hughes-edited	Best Short Stories 













¶36	The	 Island	Trees	 school	 board	 appealed,	 and	 a	majority	 of	 the	 Supreme	
Court	affirmed	the	Second	Circuit’s	 reversal	of	 summary	 judgment	and	remand	
for	a	trial.	The	three-Justice	prevailing	opinion	declared	that	a	school	library	col-
lection	required	less	judicial	deference	than	the	school	curriculum.	Quoting	Brown 
v. Louisiana, Justice Brennan	equated	the	school	library	to	the	public	library	as	“a	
place	dedicated	to	quiet,	to	knowledge,	and	to	beauty.”82	In	contrast	with	decisions	
about	which	books	to	acquire,	the	removal	of	books	was	found	to	be	both	more	








be	 orthodox	 in	 politics,	 nationalism,	 religion,	 or	 other	 matters	 of	 opinion.’”83	
Because	motivation	might	 be	 a	mixed	 bag	 of	 reasons,	 the	 district	 court	 was	 to	
determine	whether	 denial	 of	 access	 to	 ideas	was	 the	“decisive	 factor,”	which	 the	
opinion	further	defined	as	a	“substantial	factor.”84	On	the	other	hand,	if	the	court	
determined	that	the	decisive	factor	for	the	board	was	that	the	books	were	“perva-






of Negro Writers,	 the	 anonymously	 authored	Go Ask Alice,	Oliver	LaFarge’s	Laughing Boy,	Richard	
Wright’s	Black Boy,	Alice	Childress’s	A Hero Ain’t Nothin’ but a Sandwich,	and	Eldridge	Cleaver’s	Soul 
on Ice.	Id. at	856	n.3.
	 80.	 Id. at	857.
	 81.	 Pico I, 474	F.	Supp.	at	397,	rev’d,	638	F.2d	404	(2d	Cir.	1980),	aff ’d,	457	U.S.	853	(1982).
	 82.	 Pico III,	457	U.S.	at	868 (quoting	Brown	v.	Louisiana,	383	U.S.	131,	142	(1966)).
	 83.	 Id.	at	872	(Blackmun,	J.,	concurring)	(quoting	W.	Va.	Bd.	of	Educ.	v.	Barnette,	319	U.S.	624,	
642	(1943)).
	 84.	 Id. at	871	n.22	(plurality	opinion).
	 85.	 See id.	at	883	(White,	J.,	concurring).
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¶39	 Justices	 Burger,	 Powell,	 Rehnquist,	 and	O’Connor	 each	 wrote	 dissenting	
opinions.	All	 of	 the	 dissenters	 would	 have	 extended	 broad	 judicial	 deference	 to	
school	boards	in	the	management	of	school	library	collections	in	support	of	their	
inculcative	missions.	Justice	Rehnquist	wrote,	“[u]nlike	university	or	public	librar-
ies,	 elementary	 and	 secondary	 school	 libraries	 are	not	designed	 for	 freewheeling	
inquiry	.	.	.	.”86	But	Justice	Rehnquist’s	dissent	also	indicates	a	widely	shared	agree-
ment	on	the	Court	that	school	libraries	do	not	have	unlimited	discretion	in	collec-




¶40	 After	 the	 Supreme	 Court’s	 remand	 for	 trial,	 the	 Island	 Trees	 Board	 of	
Education	voted	to	return	the	books	in	question	to	the	library	shelves	to	avoid	fur-
ther	litigation.88	The four-Justice Pico standard	for	review	of	book	removal	from	a	
school	 library	 is	 not	 binding	 authority,	 but	 it	 continues	 to	 serve	 as	 persuasive	
authority	to	the	lower	courts.89	In	addition,	Justice	Rehnquist’s	dissent	contributes	








collection	 decisions	 would	 probably	 rule	 that	 the	 practice	 violates	 the	 First	
Amendment.	And	 if	 a	 county	 law	 library	 rejected	 books	 arguing	 against	 voting	
rights	 for	 women,	 the	 library	 might	 be	 called	 upon	 to	 explain	 that	 the	 books	





challenges	of	 intent	 to	 suppress	 the	 ideas.	Although	 courts	would	probably	only	
review	book	removal	decisions	under	the	Pico	plurality	standard,	the	test	can	serve	
as	a	reminder	to	librarians	during	the	selection	process	as	well,	so	that	the	librari-
	 86.	 Id.	at	915	(Rehnquist,	J.,	dissenting).	However,	in	American Library Ass’n,	Justice	Rehnquist	
wrote	 for	 the	 plurality	 that	 public	 libraries	 have	missions	 that	 require	 them	 to	 selectively	 provide	
access	to	content.	See United	States	v.	Am.	Library	Ass’n (ALA II),	539	U.S.	194,	211	(2003)	(plurality	
opinion).
	 87.	 Pico III, 457	U.S.	at	907–08	(Rehnquist,	J.,	dissenting)	(“I	would	save	for	another	day—feel-
ing	quite	confident	 that	 that	day	will	not	arrive—the	extreme	examples	posed	 in	 Justice	Brennan’s	
opinion.”).
	 88.	 In	a	formal	statement,	the	Board	said	it	wanted	to	avoid	a	trial	because	that	“would	have	the	
effect	of	surrendering	local	control	of	the	schools	to	the	courts.”	Shawn	G.	Kennedy,	School Board on 
L.I. Votes to Restore 9 Banned Books,	n.y. times,	Aug.	13,	1982,	at	B1.	
	 89.	 See ACLU	v.	Miami-Dade	County	Sch.	Bd.,	557	F.3d	1177,	1199–1200	(11th	Cir.), cert. denied,	
130	S.	Ct.	659	(2009).	
360 LAW LIBRARY JOURNAL Vol. 102:3  [2010-21]
an’s	 own	 distaste	 for	 an	 idea	 does	 not	 preclude	 the	 idea’s	 representation	 in	 the	
collection.	
United States v. American Library Ass’n
¶42	The	third	case	in	which	the	Supreme	Court	addressed	the	First	Amendment’s	
application	in	libraries	is	the	2003	decision	United States v. American Library Ass’n,	
where	public	library	Internet	filtering	was	at	issue.	Librarians	may	believe	Internet	
management	 is	 different	 from	 collection	 management,	 but	 a	 plurality	 of	 the	
Supreme	Court	found	that	library	Internet	access	is	“‘no	more	than	a	technological	
extension	of	the	book	stack.’”90	Thus,	the	holding	in	American Library Ass’n	is	an	














provided	 permissive	 but	 not	 mandatory	 conditions	 under	 which	 library	 staff	
might	decide	to	disable	the	filters.92










¶45	By	the	time	of	the	American Library Ass’n case,	First	Amendment	doctrine	
had	adopted	public	forum	analysis	to	determine	the	level	of	 judicial	scrutiny	for	
different	contexts.	The	American Library Ass’n district	court	used	forum	analysis	to	
	 90.	 United	States	v.	Am.	Library	Ass’n (ALA II),	539	U.S.	194,	207	 (2003)	 (plurality	opinion)	




	 93.	 See Ruth	A.	Fraley,	Internet Filtering in the Workplace,	AALL spectrUm, Apr.	2001,	at 10.
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allowed	 discretion	 under	 the	 First	 Amendment.	 The	 Court	 likened	 the	 public	
library	to	two	other	institutions	that	had	received	similar	deference:	editorial	dis-
cretion	 in	 public	 broadcasting	 as	 recognized	 in	Arkansas Educational Television 
Commission v. Forbes97	and	aesthetic	assessments	in	awarding	of	national	funding	
for	the	arts	as	held	in	National Endowment for Arts v. Finley.98	
¶47	The	plurality	opinion	in	American Library Ass’n does	not	discuss	the	limits	
of	libraries’	collection	management	discretion.	The	plurality	only	suggests	that	the	
content-based	Internet	filtering	was	reasonable	in	light	of	the	library’s	purpose.99	
But	 the	multiple	opinions	 reveal	 a	widely	 shared	assumption	among	 the	 Justices	
that	 if	 libraries	did	not	disable	 the	 filters	 for	patrons	 to	 gain	 access	 to	protected	
speech,	that	refusal	could	be	unreasonable	in	light	of	the	libraries’	mission.100	Justice	
	 94.	 20	U.S.C.	§	7001	note	(2006).
	 95.	 See ALA II, 539	U.S.	at	204–09	(plurality	opinion);	id. at	215–17	(Breyer,	J.,	concurring).	
	 96.	 Id.	at	204–09	(plurality	opinion).	Rather	than	drawing	on	his	Pico	dissent,	in	which	he	wrote	
that	public	libraries	were	“designed	for	freewheeling	inquiry,”	Bd.	of	Educ.	v.	Pico	(Pico III),	457	U.S.	
853,	915	 (1982) (Rehnquist,	 J.,	dissenting,	 joined	by	Burger,	C.J.,	 and	Powell,	 J.),	 Justice	Rehnquist	
wrote	 that	 the	 public	 library’s	mission	was	 to	 provide	 only	“material	 of	 requisite	 and	 appropriate	
quality	for	educational	and	informational	purposes.”	ALA II,	539	U.S.	at	211.	
	 97.	 Id. at	204	(citing	Ark.	Educ.	Television	Comm’n	v.	Forbes, 523	U.S.	666,	672–73	(1998)).	
	 98.	 Id. at	205	(citing	Nat’l	Endowment	for	the	Arts	v.	Finley, 524	U.S.	569,	585–86	(1998)). 
	 99.	 Despite	 the	 determination	 that	 forum	 analysis	 was	 inappropriate,	 the	 prevailing	 opinion	
worked	through	and	rejected	both	traditional	and	designated	public	forum	status	for	public	library	
Internet	access.	This	analysis	would	normally	imply	that	the	public	library’s	collection	was	a	nonpub-
lic	 forum,	the	default	 for	government	property	rejected	as	traditional	or	designated	public	 forums.	










App.	4th	433,	443	(Cal.	Ct.	App.	2009)	(interpreting	American Library Ass’n as	finding	libraries	to	be	
nonpublic	forums).	
	 100.	 The	 three	 dissenters	 and	 Justice	 Kennedy	 in	 his	 concurrence	 emphasized	 the	 potential	
unconstitutionality	of	permanent	filters	that	block	lawful	speech.	ALA II,	539	U.S.	at	224	(Stevens,	J.,	
dissenting);	id. at	233 (Souter,	J.,	dissenting,	joined	by	Ginsburg,	J.);	id. at	214–15	(Kennedy,	J.,	concur-
ring);	id.	at	219	(Breyer,	J.,	concurring)	(describing	unblocking	as	“an	important	exception”	to	CIPA	
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Stevens	would	have	given	 the	policy	of	deference	 to	 libraries	 the	weight	of	First	
Amendment	protection,	which	would	have	made	the	CIPA	conditions	unconstitu-
















sion,	 policy,	 and	 CIPA	 compliance.105	 Nonetheless,	 many	 public	 libraries	 have	




patrons	may	have	 the	 filtering	 software	disabled.”	 Id.	 at	209	(Rehnquist,	C.J.,	 joined	by	O’Connor,	
Scalia,	and	Thomas,	JJ.).
	 101.	 See id.	 at	 226	 (Stevens,	 J.,	 dissenting)	 (citing	 Keyishian	 v.	 Bd.	 of	 Regents,	 385	 U.S.	 589	
(1967)).
	 102.	 Id.	at	234–35	(Souter,	J.,	dissenting,	joined	by	Ginsburg,	J.).	
	 103.	 The	 American	 Library	 Association	 interpreted	 the	 decision	 to	 require	 libraries	 to	 dis-
able	 filters	or	unblock	particular	sites	 for	requesting	adults.	CIPA	Decision	Response:	A	Statement	
from	 ALA	 President	 Carla	 D.	 Hayden	 and	 the	 ALA	 Executive	 Board	 1–2	 (July	 25,	 2003),	 avail-
able at	 http://0-www.ala.org.sapl.sat.lib.tx.us/Template.cfm?Section=archive&template=/content
management/contentdisplay.cfm&ContentID=39847;	 Mary	 Minow,	 Lawfully Surfing the Net: 
Disabling	Public Library Internet Filters to Avoid More Lawsuits in the United States,	first mondAy, 
Apr.	5,	2004,	http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1132/1052.
	 104.	 See, e.g.,	 Danielle	 Sottosanti,	 Oro Valley Council Gives Its Approval to Filtering of 
Internet Porn at Library,	Ariz. dAiLy stAr,	Feb.	15,	2007,	at	9	 (describing	 library	 Internet	 filters	as	
subject	 to	discretionary	unblocking	by	 librarians	on	 library	 computers	 but	not	 to	be	disabled	 for	








also	pending	with	the	district	court.	See	Bradburn v. N. Cent. Reg’l Library Dist., No. CV-06-0327-EFS, 
2008	WL	4460018	(E.D.	Wash.	2008).
	 106.	 In	 2007,	 43.8%	 of	 public	 libraries	 reported	 that	 they	 did	 not	 apply	 for	 federal	 E-Rate	
discounts	for	Internet	access.	Thirty-eight	percent	cited	the	complicated	process,	36%	cited	the	low	
value	of	the	discount	compared	with	time	needed	to	participate,	and	33.9%	cited	the	need	to	comply	





oritize	 access	 to	 information	 in	 support	 of	 a	 collection	 policy	 are	 likely	 to	 be	
upheld.	The	safest	approach,	though,	may	be	to	provide	procedures	for	unblocking	
particular	web	sites	and	disabling	the	filter	upon	request.	
the Lower courts fill in the gaps
 Libraries as Limited Public Forums for the Right to Receive Information
¶50	After	Pico and	before	American Library Ass’n, the	lower	courts	developed	a	
line	of	opinions	that	increased	the	level	of	First	Amendment	scrutiny	courts	gave	to	
libraries’	 decisions.	 These	 cases	 shaped	 recognition	 of	 libraries	 as	 limited	 public	
forums	for	the	right	to	receive	information.	Several	cases	reviewed	regulations	of	
library	patrons	and	found	in	favor	of	the	libraries.	In	challenges	to	libraries’	deci-




eral	 district	 court	 case	 of	 American Council of the Blind v. Boorstin	 in	 1986.108	
Considering	 the	 case	 just	 a	 few	 years	 after	Pico,	 the	 district	 court	 held	 that	 the	
Library	 of	 Congress	 practice	 of	 providing	 Braille	 copies	 of	 popular	 magazines	
through	the	Library’s	Program	for	 the	Blind	and	Physically	Handicapped	consti-




providing	 the	Braille	 copies	of	Playboy.	The	 court	 found	 that	 the	 elimination	of	
Playboy	 from	 the	 program	was	 because	 of	 its	 sexually	 oriented	 content	 and	was	








the	 title	 from	 the	 program	 was	 similar	 to	 the	 analysis	 in	 the	 Pico school	 book	
removal	case.
with	CIPA’s	filtering	requirements	as	reasons	for	not	applying	for	the	E-Rate	discounts.	John	Carlo	
Bertot,	Charles	R.	McClure	&	Paul	T.	Jaeger,	The Impacts of Free Public Internet Access on Public Library 
Patrons and Communities,	78	Libr. Q.	285,	294	(2008).
	 107.	 See Fraley,	supra	note	93,	at	10.
	 108.	 Am.	Council	of	the	Blind	v.	Boorstin,	644	F.	Supp.	811	(D.D.C.	1986).
	 109.	 Id. at	815.
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¶52	The	Third	Circuit	was	the	first	court	to	recognize	public	libraries	as	limited	
public	forums	for	the	right	to	receive	information.	The	court’s	opinion	in	Kreimer 
v. Bureau of Police,110	 ten	 years	 after	 Pico, did	 not	 concern	 the	 content	 of	 the	
library’s	collection,	but	rather	regulations	on	user	behavior	and	hygiene.	Richard	








may	be	overcome	by	 significant	 competing	 interests,	 it	did	 include	“the	 right	 to	
some	 level	of	access	 to	a	public	 library,	 the	quintessential	 locus	of	 the	receipt	of	
information.”112	The	Kreimer court	reviewed	the	Pico decision	and	distinguished	
the	 inculcative	role	of	 school	 libraries	 from	the	role	of	public	 libraries	and	con-
cluded	that	 the	Morristown	 library	was	a	 limited	designated	public	 forum	dedi-
cated	“to	aid	in	the	acquisition	of	knowledge	through	reading,	writing	and	quiet	
contemplation.”113	 The	 circuit	 court	 evaluated	 whether	 each	 challenged	 library	
patron	 rule	prohibited	 activities	 that	were	within	or	 beyond	 the	purpose	of	 the	
library	as	a	limited	public	forum.	Rules	that	prohibited	behavior	inconsistent	with	






connected	decisions,	the	Virginia	federal	district	court	in	Mainstream Loudoun v. 





sued	 for	 violation	 of	 their	 First	Amendment	 rights	 to	 receive	 protected	 speech,	




	 112.	 Id. at	1255.
	 113.	 Id.	at	1261.
	 114.	 See id. at	1262–64.
	 115.	 Mainstream	 Loudoun	 v.	 Bd.	 of	 Trs.	 (Loudoun I),	 2	 F.	 Supp.	 2d	 783	 (E.D.	 Va.	 1998)	
(denying	the	defendant’s	motion	to	dismiss	and	for	summary	 judgment);	Mainstream	Loudoun	v.	
Bd.	of	Trs.	(Loudoun II), 24	F.	Supp.	2d	552	(E.D.	Va.	1998).	
	 116.	 The	 filtering	 also	 prevented	 access	 to	 e-mail	 and	 chat	 rooms,	 and	 all	 computers	 were	
positioned	 to	 be	 in	 full	 view	 of	 library	 staff.	 These	 provisions,	 however,	 were	 not	 at	 issue	 in	 the	
Mainstream Loudoun	case.	Loudoun II,	24	F.	Supp.	2d	at	556.
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¶55	The	Mainstream Loudoun court	 found	that	 the	 library	board	 intended	to	
create	 county	 libraries	“for	 the	 limited	 purposes	 of	 the	 expressive	 activities	 they	
provide,	 including	 the	 receipt	 and	 communication	 of	 information	 through	 the	
Internet.”118	The	 court	determined	 that	 Internet	 access	did	not	present	 the	 same	
scarcity	and	inculcative	mission	factors	that	justified	broad	deference	to	secondary	










¶56	 Two	 years	 later,	 a	 federal	 district	 court	 in	 Texas	 cited	 language	 in	 Pico,	
Kreimer, and	even	Brown v. Louisiana	in	holding	that	“[t]he	right	to	receive	infor-
mation	is	vigorously	enforced	in	the	context	of	a	public	library	.	.	.	.”120	In	Sund v. 
City of Wichita Falls, the	court	reviewed	community	members’	challenge	to	a	library	
board	resolution	that	allowed	library	card	holders	to	petition	for	the	relocation	of	
offensive	books	from	the	children’s	section	of	the	library	to	the	section	for	adults.	











	 117.	 Loudoun I,	2	F.	Supp.	2d	at	792.
	 118.	 Loudoun II,	24	F.	Supp.	2d	at	563.	
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¶57	The	Sixth	Circuit	in	2003	considered	a	First	Amendment	and	due	process	
challenge	to	a	public	library’s	one-day	ejection	of	a	patron	for	violation	of	a	library	
policy	requiring	the	wearing	of	shoes.123	Neinast v. Board of Trustees was	decided	
three	months	after	American Library Ass’n,	but	 the	Sixth	Circuit	did	not	cite	 the	
Supreme	Court	opinion	or	make	use	of	its	rejection	of	forum	analysis	for	public	
libraries.	The	Sixth	Circuit	 found	the	 library	was	a	 limited	public	 forum	for	 the	
right	to	receive	information	but	upheld	the	district	court’s	summary	judgment	in	





cited	Kreimer, Sund, and Mainstream Loudoun	as	support	for	its	determination	that	
the	library	is	a	limited	public	forum	for	the	right	to	receive	information.126	
Nonpublic Forums and Procedural Due Process 
¶58	Since	American Library Ass’n,	lower	courts	have	largely	avoided	use	of	the	
limited	public	forum	designation	that	formed	the	basis	 for	the	 line	of	precedent	
established	by	Kreimer, Loudoun, Sund, and Neinast. However,	a	First	Amendment	
right	to	receive	information	through	a	public	library	survived	to	form	the	basis	for	
First	Amendment	and	due	process	challenges	 to	patron	regulations	and	Internet	
use	policies.	The	Pico standard	 for	 school	 library	book	 removal	 also	 survived	as	
nonbinding	 but	 useful	 authority.	 One	 court	 considered	American Library Ass’n	





court	in	North	Carolina.	In	Miller v. Northwest Region Library Board, the	court	said	









	 124.	 See id. at	591–92.
	 125.	 Id.	at	591	(quoting	Kreimer	v.	Bureau	of	Police,	958	F.	2d	1242,	1255	(3d	Cir.	1992)).	
	 126.	 Id. 





	 129.	 Id. at	570	(quoting	Kreimer,	958	F.2d	at	1255).















The	 court	 reviewed	 the	 library	 Internet	 use	 policies	 as	 a	 nonpublic	 forum,	 and	
determined	that	they	met	standards	for	reasonableness	and	were	not	intended	to	
suppress	a	particular	viewpoint.133	
¶61	 A	 challenge	 to	 a	 library’s	 refusal	 to	 disable	 Internet	 filters	 was	 filed	 in	
Bradburn v. North Central Regional Library District.	 The	Washington	 Supreme	
Court	 ruled	 that	 state	 constitutional	 protections	 for	 speech	 did	 not	 require	 the	
library	 to	disable	 the	 filter	or	unblock	web	sites	 for	access	 to	all	 constitutionally	
protected	speech.	The	court	did	find	that	the	library	would	be	required	to	unblock	
access	 to	 sites	 inadvertently	overblocked	by	 the	 filtering	 software	 if	 the	web	 site	
content	was	consistent	with	the	library’s	mission,	collection	policy,	and	any	appli-
cable	 CIPA-compliance	 requirements.134	 Using	 the	 standards	 for	 a	 nonpublic	
forum,	the	court	held	that	 the	state	constitution	would	be	upheld	as	 long	as	 the	
library’s	filtering	policy	“is	reasonable	when	measured	in	light	of	the	library’s	mis-
sion	and	policies,	and	is	viewpoint	neutral.”135	The	application	of	the	facts	to	both	
Washington	 State	 and	 federal	 law	 remain	 within	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 federal	
district	court,	where	the	case	was	still	pending	at	the	time	of	this	writing.	
¶62	 The	 four-Justice	 Pico	 standard	 for	 review	 of	 book	 removal	 in	 a	 school	
library	 was	 accepted	 as	 persuasive	 authority	 in	 2009	 in	 the	 Eleventh	 Circuit	
upholding	of	the	removal	of	a	book	from	the	Miami-Dade	County	school	librar-
ies.136	 Neither	 the	 district	 court	 nor	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeals	 found	 the	American 
Library Ass’n opinion	 relevant	 enough	 to	merit	 distinguishing.	ACLU v. Miami-
Dade County School Board	involved	a	challenge	to	the	school	board’s	withdrawal	of	
	 130.	 Crosby,	172	Cal.	App.	4th	at	436	(quoting	the	District	Board’s	policy).
	 131.	 Id. at	438	(quoting	the	District	Board’s	policy).
	 132.	 Id. at	 443	 (citing United	 States	 v.	 Am.	 Library	 Ass’n (ALA II),	 539	 U.S.	 194,	 205–06	
(2003)).
	 133.	 Id. (citing	Perry Educ.	Ass’n	v.	Perry	Local	Educators’	Ass’n,	460	U.S.	37,	46	(1983)).
	 134.	 Bradburn	v.	N.	Cent.	Reg’l	Library	Dist.,	231	P.3d	166,	¶ 46	(Wash.	2010).
	 135.	 Id.	at	¶ 65.


















Status of First Amendment Protection for Libraries’ Collection Decisions
Nonpublic forums given Broad discretion
¶63	The	Supreme	Court’s	American Library Ass’n decision	interrupted	the	lower	
courts’	line	of	precedent	applying	high	standards	of	scrutiny	to	libraries’	Internet	
and	collection	management	as	limited	public	forums	for	the	right	to	receive	infor-
mation.	 But	 some	 boundaries	 to	 libraries’	 discretion	 are	 implicit	 in	 American 
Library Ass’n and	 explicit	 in	 other	 library	 cases.	 One	 of	 the	 ambiguities	 of	 the	







libraries	 have	 either	 broad	 discretion	 to	manage	 their	 collections	 or	 very	 broad	
discretion	to	manage	their	collections.
	 137.	 Id. at	1227.
	 138.	 The	 plurality	 points	 to	 public	 broadcasters	 and	 federal	 arts	 awards	 as	 “two	 analogous	
contexts”	in	which	“the	government	has	broad	discretion	to	make	content-based	judgments	in	decid-
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Unreasonable content-Based distinctions Prohibited
¶64	The	American Library Ass’n decision	may	be	seen	as	holding	public	libraries	





tions	 to	 be	 reasonable	 in	 light	 of	 the	 library’s	 purpose.139	 The	 district	 court	 in	















the	 boundaries	 of	 its	 First	 Amendment	 discretion.	 Law	 libraries	 are	 unlikely	 to	
violate	 the	 law,	 though,	 as	 they	 develop	 collections	 to	 meet	 the	 needs	 of	 their	
patrons.	
Viewpoint distinctions Versus content distinctions




	 139.	 See, e.g.,	 Int’l	 Soc’y	 for	 Krishna	 Consciousness,	 Inc.	 v.	 Lee,	 505	 U.S.	 672,	 678–79	 (1992)	
(outlining	qualities	of	 traditional	 and	dedicated	public	 forums	and	 then	characterizing	 the	 rest	by	
default	as	nonpublic	forums).	“Finally,	there	is	all	remaining	public	property.	Limitations	on	expres-
sive	 activity	 conducted	 on	 this	 last	 category	 of	 property	must	 survive	 only	 a	much	more	 limited	
review.	The	challenged	regulation	need	only	be	reasonable,	as	long	as	the	regulation	is	not	an	effort	to	
suppress	the	speaker’s	activity	due	to	disagreement	with	the	speaker’s	view.”	Id.
	 140.	 See Crosby v.	 S.	 Orange	 County	 Cmty.	 Coll.	 Dist.,	 172	 Cal.	 App.	 4th	 433	 (Cal.	 Ct.	 App.	
2009).
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¶67	The	complexity	of	the	collection	management	process	and	the	malleability	
of	 content	 and	 viewpoint	 categories,	 though,	 could	 make	 viewpoint	 neutrality	
review	difficult.	Viewpoint	distinctions	may	be	just	as	unavoidable	as	content	dis-




both	American Library Ass’n and	in	American Council of the Blind v. Boorstin.143	In	
American Library Ass’n,	the	Supreme	Court	treated	graphic	sexual	images	as	con-




collection	 decisions,	 even	 when	 they	 turn	 on	 distinctions	 between	 viewpoints.	
Courts	do	not	 like	 to	 review	complex	 library	 collection	decisions	 that	balance	a	
multiplicity	of	factors	such	as	quality	of	publisher,	scholarly	stature	of	the	author,	
relevance	to	local	practice	habits	or	curricular	needs,	cost,	currentness,	etc.	But	if	a	


















	 143.	 United	 States	 v.	 Am.	 Library	 Ass’n (ALA II),	 539	 U.S.	 194,	 200–01	 (2003);	 Am.	 Council	
of	the	Blind	v.	Boorstin,	644	F.	Supp.	811	(D.D.C.	1986).
	 144.	 See	ALA II,	539	U.S.	at	208.
	 145.	 See Boorstin, 644	F.	Supp.	at	816.
	 146.	 eUgene voLokh, the first Amendment And reLAted stAtUtes: probLems, cAses And 





	 147.	 Black’s Law Dictionary defines	 “invidious	 discrimination”	 as	 “[d]iscrimination	 that	 is	
offensive	or	objectionable,	esp.	because	it	involves	prejudice	or	stereotyping.”	bLAck’s LAw dictionAry 
535	(9th	ed.	2009).	The	Oxford English Dictionary	defines	“invidious”	as	“[e]ntailing	odium	or	ill-will	
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¶70	Justice	Souter’s	dissent	in	American Library Ass’n suggests	that	a	majority	of	
the	Court	would	agree	that	clear	evidence	of	a	library’s	viewpoint	discrimination	
would	offend	the	First	Amendment.	Justice	Souter	wrote	that	“in	extreme	cases”	the	
evidence	 will	 be	 available	 for	 judicial	 determination	 that	 a	 public	 library	 was	
excluding	material	 for	“impermissible	 reasons	 (reasons	 even	 the	 plurality	would	









restricting	 access	 to	 the	 political	 ideas	 or	 social	 perspectives	 discussed	 in	 them,	
when	 that	 action	 is	 motivated	 simply	 by	 the	 officials’	 disapproval	 of	 the	 ideas	
involved.”150	Blackmun	noted	widespread	support	for	this	limit	on	library	discre-
tion	among	the	plurality	and	the	dissent:	“[A]s	the	plurality	notes,	it	is	difficult	to	
see	 how	 a	 school	 board,	 consistent	 with	 the	 First	Amendment,	 could	 refuse	 for	
political	reasons	to	buy	books	written	by	Democrats	or	by	Negroes,	or	books	that	
are	‘anti-American’	 in	 the	broadest	 sense	of	 that	 term.	 Indeed,	 Justice	Rehnquist	
appears	‘cheerfully	 [to]	 concede’	 this	 point.”151	 The	 Eleventh	Circuit	 applied	 the	
Pico	standard	in	Miami-Dade but	upheld	the	school	book	removal,	finding	that	the	
impermissible	intent	was	not	the	sole	motivation.152	Miami-Dade shows	that	this	
low	standard	 for	 impermissibility	presents	difficult	 evidentiary	challenges.	When	
other	criteria	coexist	with	impermissible	motivation,	determination	of	what	is	pre-
text	and	what	is	motivation	is	elusive.153	
¶72	 The	 hypotheticals	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 this	 article—a	 collection	 of	
Democratic	 but	 not	 Republican	 authors,	 rejection	 of	 donated	 books	 arguing	
against	voting	rights	for	women,	filtering	of	web	sites	on	women’s	breast	health,	and	
removal	of	 racist	publications—present	a	 range	of	potential	 invidious	viewpoint	
upon	the	person	performing,	discharging,	discussing,	etc.”	8	oxford engLish dictionAry 50 (2d	ed.	
1989).	Martin	Redish	describes	invidious	viewpoint	discrimination	as	that	which	targets	the	speaker	
because	 of	 hostility	 toward	 the	 speaker’s	 “pre-existing	 ideological	 and	 political	 expressive	 asso-
ciations.”	Martin	Redish,	Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and the Twilight Zone of 
Viewpoint Discrimination, 41	Loy. L.A. L. rev.	67,	117	(2007).
	 148.	 ALA II,	 539	U.S. at	 236	 (Souter,	 J.,	 dissenting)	 (citing	Bd.	 of	 Educ.	 v.	 Pico	 (Pico III),	 457	
U.S.	853,	870–71	(1982)	(plurality	opinion)).
	 149.	 Pico III,	 457	 U.S.	 at	 872	 (quoting	 W.	 Va.	 Bd.	 of	 Educ.	 v.	 Barnette,	 319	 U.S.	 624,	 642	
(1943)).
	 150.	 Id.	at	879–80	(Blackmun,	J.,	concurring	in	part	and	concurring	in	the	judgment).	
	 151.	 Id. at	878.
	 152.	 ACLU	 v.	 Miami-Dade	 County	 Sch.	 Bd.,	 557	 F.3d	 1177,	 1207	 (11th	 Cir.), cert. denied,	
130	S.	Ct.	659	(2009).
	 153.	 Joelle	 C.	 Achtman,	 Note,	 Pico Takes a Visit to Cuba: Will Pretext Become Precedent in 
the Eleventh Circuit?, 63	U. miAmi L. rev.	943	(2009)	(reviewing	public	school	library	book	removal	
challenges).
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have	 a	 difficult	 time	 defending	 the	 action	 if	 challenged.154	 If	 the	 book	was	 not	
appropriate	for	other	reasons,	such	as	not	supporting	an	updated	collection	devel-
opment	policy	or	not	being	a	priority	when	shelf	space	is	tight,	the	coexistence	of	




Procedural due Process for Internet Acceptable-Use Policies
¶73	When	libraries	create	Internet	use	policies	that	limit	patrons’	access	to	ille-
gal	or	low-priority	content	in	keeping	with	the	library’s	collection	policy	and	mis-
sion,	 the	American Library Ass’n decision	makes	clear	 that	 libraries	are	probably	
within	 their	discretion	under	 the	First	Amendment.	However,	when	patrons	 are	
found	in	violation	of	the	library’s	policies,	the	Miller	district	court	opinion	stands	
as	 an	 indication	 that	 the	 library	 may	 be	 held	 to	 some	 procedural	 due	 process	




first Amendment Rights of Libraries
¶74	The	library	plaintiffs	in	American Library Ass’n	argued	that	their	authority	
to	 make	 collection	 decisions	 should	 have	 First	 Amendment	 speech	 status	 and	
therefore	 be	 immune	 to	 the	 regulatory	 and	 even	 conditional	 funding	 efforts	 of	
Congress.	Justice	Stevens,	in	dissent,	embraced	this	argument	and	wrote	that	CIPA	
offends	the	First	Amendment	because	it	impairs	the	ability	of	local	libraries	to	truly	
	 154.	 “The	 U.S.	 approach	 to	 regulation	 of	 racist	 speech	 is	 one	 of	 broad	 protection,	 with	 the	
exception	of	situations	in	which	such	speech	is	coupled	with	violence.”	Jeannine	Bell,	Restraining the 
Heartless: Racist Speech and Minority Rights,	84	ind. L.J.	963	(2009);	see R.A.V.	v.	St.	Paul,	505	U.S.	377	
(1992).
	 155.	 See Bell,	 supra note	 154,	 at	 975	 (citing	 Doe	 v.	 Michigan,	 721	 F.	 Supp.	 852	 (E.D.	 Mich.	
1989)	and	UMW	Post	v.	Bd.	of	Regents	of	Univ.	of	Wis.,	774	F.	Supp.	1163	(E.D.	Wis.	1991)).	
	 156.	 See Miller	v.	Nw.	Region	Library	Bd., 348	F.	Supp.	2d	563	(M.D.N.C.	2004).
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employ	 their	 own	 discretion	 and	 acts	“as	 a	 blunt	 nationwide	 restraint	 on	 adult	
access	.	.	.	.”157	The	libraries’	claim	was	noted	by	the	plurality	as	an	argument	that	






















tion.	 But	 the	 boundaries	 of	 libraries’	 First	 Amendment	 discretion	 can	 protect	
librarians’	efforts	to	provide	access	to	information,	even	when	that	information	is	









	 157.	 United	 States	 v.	 Am.	 Library	 Ass’n (ALA II),	 539	 U.S.	 194,	 220	 (2003)	 (Stevens,	 J.,	
dissenting)	 (rejecting	 the	 constitutional	 conditions	doctrine’s	 recognition	of	 a	 distinction	between	
inducement	through	restrictions	on	benefits	and	outright	prohibitions).	
	 158.	 See id. at	211	(plurality	opinion).
	 159.	 See, e.g.,	 Judith	 Areen,	 Government as Educator: A New Understanding of First 
Amendment Protection of Academic Freedom and Governance, 97	 geo. L.J.	 945	 (2009);	 Neal	 H.	
Hutchens,	 A Confused Concern of the First Amendment: The Uncertain Status of Constitutional 
Protection for Individual Academic Freedom, 36	J.c. & U.L.	145	(2009);	Frederick	Schauer,	Is There a 
Right to Academic Freedom?,	77	U. coLo. L. rev.	907	(2006).	
374 LAW LIBRARY JOURNAL Vol. 102:3  [2010-21]
or	 tolerances.	Law	 librarians	 are	 the	primary	 custodians	of	 libraries’	broad	First	
Amendment	 discretion	 and	 should	 exercise	 that	 discretion	 with	 awareness	 that	
collection	management	can	support	library	institutional	missions,	librarians’	ethi-
cal	principles,	and	a	number	of	the	important	goals	of	the	First	Amendment.		

